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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 940657-CA
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Priority No. 2

KEVIN GURR,
De fendant/Appe11ant.

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE
DEFENDANT OF POSSESSING A DANGEROUS WEAPON.
A.
There

The Definition of the Crime.
is

no

dispute

in

this

case

as

to

the

statutory

definition of Count III of the Information in this case charging
the

Defendant

with

restricted person.

possessing

a

dangerous

weapon

while

a

Utah Code Annotated 76-10-503(1)(a) (1989 as

Amended), provides that "any person who has been convicted of any
crime of violence . . . may not own or have in his possession or
under his control any dangerous weapon as defined in this part."
The

meaning

of

the

terms

"custody

and

control"

and

"possession" as used in Utah Code Annotated 76-10-503 (1989 as
Amended), is not established by statute.

However, case law has

provided the definition to be used by the courts in interpreting
the statute.

In State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232, 233 (Utah 1985),

the Utah Supreme Court approved the following jury instruction:
"possession, custody or control" of a firearm
is more than the innocent handling of the weapon.
It requires a willing and knowing possession with

intent to control its use or management.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Banks, 720 P. 2d 1380
(Utah 1986) provided further guidance in stating:
If the evidence showed that Banks "exercised
dominion and control" over the weapon, "with
knowledge of its presence," we would have no
difficulty holding that Banks could be convicted,
even though he may have shared control of the weapon
with his wife and the third party

. . . .

Id.
The cased cited above clearly establish that in order to
convict

the Defendant, there must be proof

elements as it relates to the Defendant's
and

control."

"exercised

The

of two

essential

"possession, custody

State must prove that the Defendant

dominion

and

control

over

the

weapon

and

both
had

knowledge of its presence."
The Appellee acknowledges that the statute and supporting
case

law establish

the

standard of proof

set out

above

(See

Appellee's brief at 6 ) .
B.

Test on Appeal.

The previous

decisions

of

the Utah Appellate Courts

are

clear as to the test to be employed by this Court in reviewing a
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

As stated by the

Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Strain, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 35
(Utah Ct. App. 1994),
evidence

supporting

the Defendant must marshall

all of the

the jury verdict and then demonstrate how
2

this evidence, even viewed in the most favorable light, is
insufficient to support the verdict.
The

Court

will

reverse

a decision

on

the

basis

of

insufficiency of the evidence "only when the evidence is so
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that 'reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the Defendant
committed the crime."

Id.

See also, State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d

540, 543 (Utah 1994); State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604, 607-08
(Utah App. 1984); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah App.
1991); State v. Purdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1207 (Utah App. 1991).
The Appellee's

conclusion

that the Appellant has not

marshalled the evidence is clearly erroneous (Appellee's brief
at 7).

The Appellant set out a comprehensive statement of the

facts outlining the testimony at trial (Appellant's brief at 813).

In addition, the Appellant recited all of the evidence

established in favor of the verdict in its argument (Appellant's
brief at 16-20).
C.

Summary of the Evidence in This Case.

It is respectfully submitted that the evidence in this case
does not establish that Mr. Gurr exercised dominion and control
over the weapons.
i.

The 12 Gauge Mossberg Shotgun.

The testimony regarding the 12 gauge Mossberg shotgun is
not in dispute.

The State elicited only limited testimony from

the investigating officers.

Officer Blackhurst testified that he

recovered two firearms consisting of a rifle and shotgun in a
3

"built-in kind of closet" (T. 145-146).
It was the Defendant who called Tom King, the owner of the
business and camp trailer where the Defendant was arrested.

Mr.

King testified that the 12 gauge Mossberg shotgun belonged to
him and had never been used by the Defendant.

Mr. King verified

that he kept the shotgun in the trailer for his own purposes (T.
190, 206-07).
In the Appellee's brief there is no citation to the record
revealing that anyone ever saw the Defendant, Mr. Gurr, in
possession of the 12 gauge Mossberg shotgun (Appellee's brief at
7-9).

The only evidence cited by the Appellee that relates to

the shotgun is that the Defendant had stayed in the trailer where
the shotgun was located (Appellee's brief at 7-9).
There is simply no evidence to establish that Mr. Gurr ever
exercised dominion or control over the shotgun belonging to Mr.
King during the time that he stayed in the camp trailer.

There

is no question that the camp trailer was used by a large number
of people and in fact was owned by Mr. King.

One of the personal

items kept by Mr. King in his camp trailer was his shotgun.

The

Record establishes that the business had been the subject of
theft and vandalism.

It was because of theft and vandalism that

Mr. King had asked the Defendant to stay in the camp trailer (T.
177-78).

There is nothing unusual about Mr. King's retention of

a firearm in the camp trailer which adjoined his business, T & T
Mechanical (T. 177-78).
The evidence as it relates to dominion and control over the

4

Mossberg 12 gauge shotgun clearly fails.

There is simply no

evidence supporting the test outlined by the statute and case
law.
ii.

Springfield .22 Caliber Rifle.

Again, the only evidence offered by the State regarding the
rifle was that of Officer Blackhurst that he found the rifle,
along with the shotgun in the built-in closet (T. 145-46).

The

State offered no testimony that the Defendant had knowledge of
the presence of the firearms or ever exercised dominion and
control over the rifle.
The Defendant produced testimony that the subject camp
trailer was a small unit measuring approximately 10 feet wide by
12 feet in length.

The Defendant testified that he had lived in

the small camp trailer for approximately two years prior to
moving in with his girlfriend on October 1, 1993 (T. 176-78).
The search in this case was conducted on October 20, 1993 (R. 3031).

The Defendant's occupancy of the trailer in question was

not exclusive.

The trailer was used by Steven Page, Mr. Tom

King's foster son, who was living in the larger mobile home
located in close proximity to the small camp trailer.

The

significance of Mr. Page's use was established by testimony.

The

larger mobile home did not have water, power or telephone
service.

Steven Page was allowed access to the small camp

trailer in order to allow him the ability to shower, use the
bathroom, make telephone calls and reside in the unit at night
that had lights (T. 178-79).

It is respectfully submitted that a
5

person who uses the camp trailer

for bathroom, power and

telephone access as well as night-time use, certainly would have
personal items located therein.
In addition to Steven Page, the small camp trailer was used
by Myron Johnson as well as Steven Page to watch T.V. (T. 179,
202-03).

Finally, the trailer was used by workers at Mr. King's

mechanical

shop during the day for coffee breaks and other

miscellaneous uses.

Mr. King used the trailer to do his book

work (T. 179-80, 202-04).
The Appellee's conclusion that only the Defendant lived in
the trailer and had his personal belongings located therein is a
total misstatement of the evidence (Appellee's brief at 8). As
recited above, Mr. Tom King used the trailer consistently to do
his

book

work

and

used

the

trailer

to

store

firearms.

Additionally, both Steven Page and Myron Johnson used the trailer
in order to have bathroom and telephone access and to watch T.V.
and have a power source at night.
It is true that the Defendant testified that the rifle
belonged to his father.

The State argues that the Defendant's

father did not have independent access to the small camp trailer
(Appellee's brief at 9 ) .

However, there was no testimony

regarding the transportation of the rifle to the camp trailer or
the person or persons who used the rifle, if any.

As summarized

on pages 8 and 9 of the State's brief the sole evidence that
supports the State's position is: 1) the Defendant was one of
several

occupants

of the camp trailer;
6

2) the

Defendant

acknowledged that the rifle belonged to his father; and 3) the
Defendant's father did not have access to the trailer.
What is obviously missing from the State's case is the
following.

First, there was no testimony that the rifle was

purchased or owned by the Defendant, Kevin Gurr.

Second, there

was no testimony that the rifle was placed in Mr. King's camp
trailer by the Defendant as opposed to the Defendant's father or
the friends and relatives of the Defendant.

Third, there is not

one scintilla of evidence that the Defendant ever held the rifle
in question or used the same.

Fourth, that during the time the

Defendant was moving in with his girlfriend in Springville, that
he considered the rifle a possession of his and provided for its
transportation to his new residence or provided for its security.
D.

The Law as Applied to the Facts of This Case.

The State's case as it relates to the rifle is based on
innuendo.

The State argues that because the Defendant resided in

the small camp trailer and that the rifle belonged to his father,
there is a "link" between the Defendant and the rifle.

In other

words, the State contends that acknowledgement by a Defendant
that a firearm is located at his residence, without more, is
sufficient to sustain a finding that the Defendant controlled the
weapon (Appellee's brief at 7-9).
The case law establishes that the evidence is insufficient
as a matter of law.

The jury instruction approved in State v.

Davis, 711 P.2d 232, 233 (Utah 1985), is dispositive:
"Possession, custody or control" of a firearm is
7

more than the innocent handling of the weapon.

It

requires a willing and knowing possession with intent
to control its use or management."
The instruction recited above explicitly contemplates that a
restricted

person

might

handle

innocently,

a firearm.

The

instruction recites that the statute requires more than innocent
handling.

There must be proof that the Defendant possessed the

firearm with intent to control its use or management.

In this

case, aside from the proof that the rifle was in a small camp
trailer

occupied

non-exclusively

by

the Defendant,

there

is

absolutely no evidence that the Defendant ever held the rifle or
exerted control over its use or management.
Instead, the testimony is that the rifle was located in a
closet where Mr. King stored his shotgun.

There was no testimony

that the Defendant ever held or used the rifle.

Additionally,

there is no evidence that the Defendant ever dictated who could
use the gun or the persons who would have access to it.

There is

no evidence of one single element that could be interpreted as
control, use or management.
The

State's case rests entirely on the premise

that the

Defendant's non-exclusive occupancy of a residence where a gun is
located is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt.

There are

a large number of scenarios that are analogous to the present
case.

If a roommate vacates an apartment, leaving a firearm that

was used by him, is the remaining tenant (a restricted person),
guilty under the statute?.

If a husband and wife separate and

8

one of the parties is left with a firearm at the family home, is
the restricted person remaining in the home guilty of unlawful
conduct?.
It is respectfully submitted that the issue was resolved in
State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380 (Utah 1986).
no-knock warrant revealed Banks

The execution of a

(an admittedly

"restricted

person" as defined by statute), his wife and a third party as
residents of the house.

During the subsequent search, the

officers saw a shotgun leaning against a dresser in a bedroom.

A

further search of the residence revealed three other guns: two
were found under the pillow on a bed and a third was in a bedroom
dresser drawer. Id.
In reviewing the facts, the Utah Supreme Court agreed that
the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for
possessing a firearm:
Section 76-10-503(1) of the Code prohibits any
person who has been convicted of a crime of violence
from owning or having a dangerous weapon "in his
possession or under his control."
was

a restricted

person

prohibitions applied.

Banks unquestionably

to whom

the

Statute's

The only question, then, is

whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that
Banks possessed or controlled the .22 caliber Ruger
found in

bedroom at his residence.

Id.
Banks contended that although the weapon was found under a
9

pillow in a bedroom, there was no evidence to indicate that the
bedroom was occupied by Banks rather than his wife or the third
party who also resided in the apartment.
evidence that Banks owned a gun.

Further, there was no

The State argued that the

presence of the gun in Bank's residence should be enough to
impute its possession and control to him, even if he shared the
residence and therefore the possession of the gun with his wife
and third party.

In response, the Court stated:

If the evidence showed that Banks "exercised dominion
and control" over the weapon, "with knowledge of its
presence," we would have no difficulty holding that
Banks could be convicted, even though he may have
shared control of the weapon with his wife and the
third party. See State v. Bankhead, 514 P.2d 800, 803
(Utah 1973); State v. Winters, 396 P.2d 872, 874 (Utah
1964). However, there is absolutely no evidence that
Banks knew the weapon was in the apartment or that
he exercised any control over it.

There is no logic to

the State's suggestion that the mere presence of a gun
in banks' house supports an inference that Banks knew
the gun was present or that he had some control over
it.

Nor does the record suggest that either the third

party or Banks1 wife was a restricted person who could
not

lawfully own or possess a gun.

There is no

evidence, for example, that Banks, rather than the
third party who admittedly lived in the house, slept in
10

or otherwise used the bedroom or bed in which the gun
was found.
that
meant

It would be wholly arbitrary to conclude

the mere presence of the gun in the

apartment

that Banks, rather than one of the other

two

people residing there, possessed or controlled it.

The

record here shows a simple failure to prove a critical
element

of the offense; we must

therefore

find that

there was insufficient evidence to s u p p o r t

the

conviction and reverse. (Emphasis added.)
Id.
The State's analysis of the Banks decision is incomplete and
inaccurate (Appellee's brief at 8 ) .

There is no question that

there was insufficient evidence in Banks to conclude that the
defendant knew of the presence of the firearms.

However, the

Supreme Court's analysis did not turn exclusively on knowledge of
the existence of the guns at the residence.
"there

is no

logic

to the

State's

The Court held that

suggestion

that

the

mere

presence of a gun . . . supports an inference that Banks knew the
gun was present or that he had some control over it."
The

Court

in Banks held

that even though

the

Id.
defendant

resided in a house where a shotgun was found leaning against a
dresser

in a bedroom,

two guns were

found under pillows and

another gun was found in a bedroom dresser drawer, the jury could
not

impute

defendant.

knowledge

or

control

over

the

firearms

to

the

The Court found that any such attempt to link the

defendant would be "wholly arbitrary."
11

Id.

It is respectfully submitted that as in Banks, the mere nonexclusively occupancy of the Defendant in a residence where a gun
is

located

is

not

sufficient

to

justify

conviction.

The

Defendant's candid testimony that his father owned the rifle does
not

help

the

State's

case.

That

acknowledgement

neither

establishes the identity of the person placing the gun in the
trailer nor establish any control, domination or use of the gun
by

the Defendant.

As

in Banks the Record

shows a complete

failure to prove one of the two critical elements of the offense.
The

Defendant

inconclusive
reasonable

that

doubt.

submits

that

reasonable
The

the

minds

Utah

evidence
must

Appellate

have

Courts

is

in

fact

so

entertained
have

a

required

evidence demonstrating control or use and the State's case simply
failed to provide any such evidence.
E.

The Findings of the Trial Court are Insufficient to
Support Conviction.

The Appellant argued in its original brief that the trial
court's finding was insufficient as a matter of law, to support
the conviction

(Appellant's

brief

at 2 0 ) .

The Appellee

has

totally failed to respond to the argument (Appellee's brief at 69).
The

court's

Defendant,

finding

in

this

that

the

"while he did not own the firearms, knowingly

had

possession of the weapons" (R. 88).

case

was

only

As established in State v.

Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767 (Utah App. 1990), the trial court findings
must disclose "the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each
factual issue was reached."

Id.
12

As outlined by the decisions on

the subject there is no evidence or factual findings by the court
linking the presence of the rifle in the camp trailer to the
required elements of the crime charged.

It is impossible to tell

what evidence the trial court used to equate to possession of the
weapons.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN DETERMINING
THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS A "RESTRICTED PERSON."
A.

Definition of the Crime.

The Defendant was charged with violating Utah Code Annotated
76-10-503(1) (1994 as Amended), which prohibits a restricted
person from possessing a dangerous weapon.

Utah Code Annotated

76-10-503(1)(a) (1989 as Amended) defines a restricted person as
a "person who has been convicted of any crime of violence
Utah Code Annotated

76-10-501(2)(a) defines

..."

"crime of

violence" as:
. . . aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter,
rape, mayhem, kidnapping, robbery, burglary,
housebreaking, extortion, or blackmail accompanied
by threats of violence, assault with a dangerous
weapon, assault. . . arson. . . or an attempt to
commit any of these offenses. (Emphasis added.)
B.

Test on Appeal.

The trial court's interpretation of a statute
question of law. State v. Shipler, 869 P. 2d

presents a

968 (Utah App.

1994); Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990).
The Utah Court of Appeals "reviews questions of law under a
correction of error standard, without deference to the trial
13

court." State v. Bagshaw, 836 P. 2d 1384, 1385 (Utah App. 1992);
State v. Shipler, supra.
C.

Evidence in This Case.

The evidence relating to the Defendant's conviction of a
prior criminal act encompassed the offering of State's Exhibit
No.

1, a Minute Entry

from Case No. CR-86-144, filed

in the

Fourth Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah,
dated May 2, 1986.

The Minute Entry is entitled "Judgment" and

states in pertinent part as follows:
The defendant [Kevin Gurr] previously entered a
plea of Guilty to a charge of Burglary, a Third
Degree Felony, at which time the matter was referred
to Adult Probation and Parole. . . M r . Petro,
[Defendant's attorney] had a motion to sentence
defendant under the next lower offense. . . The
Court granted the defense motion and defendant to
be sentenced under a Class A Misdemeanor due to the
circumstances surrounding the charge. . . . (Emphasis
added.)
State's

Exhibit No

1, Addendum

No. 2 to Appellant's

original

brief.
D.

The Law Applied to the Facts of the Case.

The

State

conviction
substance:
different

to

argues

that

a Class

A

a
degree

burglary

the

reduction

Misdemeanor
remains

of burglary

of

"has no

a burglary,

the

Defendant's

affect
but

on

becomes

. . . under the statutes
14

its
a

plain

language, Defendant's conviction for burglary constitutes a crime
of violence."

(Appellee's brief at 10-11).

The version of Utah Code Annotated 76-3-402 (under which
Judge Christensen reduced the conviction) in effect at the time
the Defendant entered his plea permitted a trial court to "enter
a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense .
. ..

The version of the section now in effect allows the court

to "enter a judgement of conviction for the next lower degree of
offense.

The State argues that there is some difference between

the sections.

As outlined hereinafter, there is no substantive

difference and clearly the section in effect at the time the
Defendant was alleged to have committed the crime is the relevant
statute.

Additionally, inasmuch as the statute is clearly

procedural in nature, the section would be retroactive.

Pilcher

v. State, 663 P.2d 450, 455 (Utah 1983); Roark v. Crabtree, 262
Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1995).
There is no meaningful distinction between "categories" and
"degrees."
Capital,

Felonies are "categorized" into four categories:
First

Degree,

Second

Degree

and

Third

Degree.

Misdemeanors are categorized into Class A, Class B and Class C.
The change in the statute does not broaden the power of the court
or change the substantive effect of U.C.A. 76-3-402.

In fact,

the change in the section really has no effect on this case.
Utah

Code Annotated

76-3-402(2)(a)

(1991 as Amended),

controls this case:
If a conviction is for a Third Degree Felony the
15

conviction is considered to be for a Class A
Misdemeanor if:
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be
for a Class A Misdemeanor and the sentence
imposed is within the limits provided by
law for a Class A Misdemeanor

....

There is no question that Mr. Gurr entered a plea to a Third
Degree Felony charge of Burglary which was reduced, pursuant to
U.C.A. 76-3-402 to a Class A Misdemeanor.
The remaining issue is the effect of the reduction to a
Class A Misdemeanor on the Defendant's alleged status as a
restricted person.
U.C.A. 76-10-501(2)(a) (1994 as Amended) explicitly defines
"crime of violence."

Everyone of the listed crimes are felonies.

The definitional statute makes it clear that only those offenses
punishable by imprisonment

for more than one year are the

offenses which are considered crimes of violence.

_Id.

See also

U.C.A. 76-3-204 and 76-3-203 (1983 as Amended).
When the trial court reduced Mr. Gurr's charge to a Class A
Misdemeanor and imposed sentence accordingly, Judge Christensen
fulfilled the mandate established by U.C.A. 76-3-402 that he
reduced conviction and sentence are to deemed for the lesser
charge.

No one can argue that Mr. Gurr was convicted of a felony

after Judge Christensen reduced the conviction to a Class A
Misdemeanor.

There is no statute or case law that limits the

purposes for which the reduction to the next lower category can
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be used.
In reviewing a statute, it is the duty of this Court assume
that each term of a statute was used advisedly and that each
should be given interpretation and application in accord with
their usually accepted meaning. Grant v. Utah State Land Bd., 485
P.2d 1035 (Utah 1971); Board of Education of Granite School Dist.
v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030 (Utah 1983).

A statute should

not be applied other than in accordance with its literal wording
unless it is so unclear or inoperable. Gord v. Salt Lake City,
434 P.2d 449 (Utah 1967); Cox Rock Products v. Walker Pipeline
Const., 754 P.2d 672 (Utah App. 1988); Gleave v. Denver & Rio
Grande Western R. Co., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah App. 1988).
The statute does not limit the purpose for which the charge
is lowered and does not distinguish the uses to which a 402
reduction can be put.

The statute is clear that it is not only

the sentence that will be influenced but that the actual judgment
of conviction is lowered to the "next category" of offense.
It is only logical that if that reduction affords a person
any benefit as it relates to rights and privileges, there is
nothing in the statute that restricts it's use.

In other words,

if a Third Degree Felony is reduced to a Class A Misdemeanor by
means of a 402 motion, the person would no longer have the
limitations of a felony as it affects voting, bonding or the
like.

Similarly, if a 402 motion eliminates a person from a

category of restricted persons, the defendant should have the
benefit of the reduction.
17

The State argues that the reduction does not affect the fact
that

the

Defendant

pleaded

guilt

to all of

burglary (Appellee's brief at 11).

the

elements

of

The problem with the State's

argument is that every crime which is included in the definition
of "crime of violence" is a felony.

There are no misdemeanors

that can be used to substantiate a charge that a person has been
convicted of a crime of violence.
Defendant

convicted

Misdemeanor.

of

a

The issue is simple.

Third

Degree

Felony

or

Class

A

As set out above, both U.C.A. 76-3-402 and Judge

Christensen's

explicit

Ruling

clearly

establish

Defendant was convicted of a Class A Misdemeanor.
convicted

Was the

of

a

automatically

Class

A

Misdemeanor,

the

that

the

Having been

conviction

is

excluded

from the crimes defined

as

"crimes of

This Court should

also note that burglary

is

statutorily

violence."

defined as a Second Degree or Third Degree Felony (U.C.A. 76-6202).
Even

if

this

convicted

of

a Class A Misdemeanor

burglary,

the

restricted

Court

Court

person.

refers to burglary.
Degree

crime.

Misdemeanor,

concludes

can

not

find

The

definition

that

the

alleging
that
of

the

Defendant

was

the elements of
Defendant

"crimes

was

a

of violence"

Burglary is defined as a Second or Third

When

it could

the
no

charge

was

reduced

longer be a burglary

statute.
The State argues:
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to

a

Class

as defined

A
by

Defendant confuses "category" with "lesser included
offense."

Section 76-3-402 allows the trial court

to lower the former, it does not permit a trial
court to enter judgment on a lesser included offense
from that for which the defendant was convicted or to
which the defendant pleaded.
Appellee's brief at 12.
The argument of the State makes no sense.

U.C.A. 76-3-402

allows a trial court to enter a judgment of conviction for the
next lower category of offense.
there

is no meaningful

"degree."

As explicitly set out above,

difference

between

"category"

and

Judge Christensen reduced the conviction to a Class A

Misdemeanor and the fact is there is no misdemeanor burglary.
Because a reduction of sentence under 76-3-402 is not
restricted as to use and because crimes of violence are by
definition, felonies, a conviction of a Class A Misdemeanor can
not be a crime of violence.

A Ruling by this Court that a

reduced conviction could be used to enforce prohibitions against
felons would be confusing and lead to distortion of the statutes
and case law governing 402 reductions.
Lastly, the result urged by the State is inequitable.

The

Defendant believed that he had been convicted of a Class A
Misdemeanor and had the right to vote, be bonded and enjoy the
other freedoms of the citizenry.

There is nothing that would

have alerted the Defendant to a risk of prosecution based upon a
felony conviction.
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It is respectfully

submitted that this Court should hold

that a 402 reduction is in fact to be used for all purposes under
the law in interpreting the conviction of a Defendant and that
"crimes of violence" by definition, are felonies.

Accordingly,

the Defendant was not a restricted person and was not prohibited
in possessing firearms.
POINT III: THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE
DEFENDANT OF POSSESSING MARIJUANA WITH THE INTENT TO
DISTRIBUTE.
The

evidence

regarding

the

Defendant's

conviction

of

possession with the intent to distribute was clearly set out in
Appellant's

brief

in

the

Procedural

History

of

the

Case

(Appellant's brief at 6-7); the Statement of Facts (Appellant's
brief at 8-12); and in the Argument (Appellant's brief at 25-27).
The Appellant
evidence.

has clearly met his burden

State v. Strain/ supra.

in marshalling

the

The assertion of the State to

the contrary is erroneous (Appellee's brief at 14-15).
The trial court's Findings with regard to the

possession

charge recite:
4.

No one else resided in the trailer at the time of

the execution of the search warrant.
5.

Personal property including possessions and

clothing of the Defendant were located in the
trailer . . .
7.

Officers located 8 separate baggys containing 1/8

ounce and 1/4 ounce quantities of marijuana in the
trailer in the general vicinity of the built-in table
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on the end of the trailer.
8.

Officers alow located a set of "finger scales",

capable of measuring small amounts or quantities.
9.

Near the table officers located a number of

larger sized bags containing marijuana residue.
Officers testified that the bags were of the type
typically used to package larger amounts of marijuana
which would then be broken for sale into smaller
quantities such as baggies of marijuana . . .
12.

A Motorola mobile phone was found within

the trailer.
13.

In response to questions from the officers, the

Defendant stated that the marijuana had been "fronted"
or provided on credit and that people called on the
phone to inquire about marijuana.
14.

Officers located several pipes used for the

ingestion of marijuana.
R. 87-89.
As outlined above, there was evidence of marijuana leaves in
the trailer, finger scales, plastic sandwich bags (which were
consistent with the making of sandwiches by the persons using the
trailer); five one gallon plastic bags. The total marijuana found
was 27.5 grams (T. 147-48).

The large one gallon plastic bags

and the smaller sandwich bags were not tested and did not contain
residue of marijuana.

The testimony of the officers of the

amount of marijuana that could be contained in the plastic bags
21

is irrelevant in that no marijuana or residue were found in
them.
The issue in this case is whether the findings of the
relatively small amount of marijuana can be used to support a
finding of "intent to distribute."

The Defendant contends that

the existence of paraphernalia including the finger scales and
plastic bags is not sufficient to support intent to distribute.
The State does not argue with the analogy to Utah Code
Annotated 58-37-8(2)(b)(i-iii) (1953 as Amended) as demonstrating
the amount of marijuana in this case is not sufficient to
indicate

an intent

to distribute

the same.

The

statute

categorizes possession of 100 pounds of marijuana or more as a
Second Degree Felony.

Possession of 16 ounces to 100 pounds is a

Third Degree Felony.

Possession of less than 16 ounces is a

Class A Misdemeanor.

In this case, the Defendant had less than

16 ounces consistent with a Class A Misdemeanor, yet the
Defendant was charged and convicted of a felony.
In the Appellant's original brief, reference is made to a
large number of cases that have required a finding of substantial
quantities of drugs to warrant a finding of an intent to
distribute (Appellant's brief at 28, 29).
The State in response has referred the Court to three cases.
The first is State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987).

The

defendants in that case were found with 78 grams of marijuana.
The testimony at trial was the approximate 3 ounces was more
than the defendants would hold for personal use.
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Id.

The amount

of marijuana found in Constantino was nearly 3 times the amount
found in this case.
The next case cited by the State is State v. Hansen, 710
P.2d 182 (Utah 1985).
found.

The

paraphernalia

In that case, 13.5 grams of cocaine were

court

explicitly

coupled

with the

held

that

"relatively

the

finding

of

large quantity of

cocaine . . . provided the jury with an adequate basis to find an
intent to distribute for value."

Id.

The last case cited is

State v. Phelps, 782 P.2d 196 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
the

officers

garbage."

found

The

"large

officers

quantities

found

drug

of

In that case

marijuana

scales,

in

the

sophisticated

distilling equipment and 8 grocery bags filled with 15 pounds of
dried marijuana.

Id.

There is no question that the Defendant had a small amount
of marijuana that could be attributed to him.
find plastic bags and finger scales.

The officers did

However, under the case law

set out in the Appellant's original brief and the case law relied
upon

by

the

State,

the

existence

of

paraphernalia

such

as

scales, bags and the like, without a finding of large quantities
of

drugs

is

insufficient

distribute.
personal

a finding

of

intent

to

The amount found in this case was consistent for

use

constitute

to support

and

clearly

sufficient

insufficient

quantity

to

under

support

the
an

cases

to

intent

to

distribute.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant does not appeal or dispute the finding of the
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trial court as it relates to the possession of drug
paraphernalia.
As it relates to possession of a firearm by a restricted
person, the case law and evidence establish that the Defendant
had been convicted of a Class A Misdemeanor.

The Class A

Misdemeanor could not be construed as a "crime of violence" which
would then make the Defendant a restricted person.

Secondly, the

court's findings with regard to control of the rifle were
insufficient. The evidence establishes that the Defendant neither
owned nor controlled the rifle in question.
Finally, the evidence was insufficient to support a
conviction of "intent to distribute." The evidence simply
supports possession and the finding of the trial court in that
regard should be reversed.
Dated this X

day of May, 1995.

Michael J. Petro, Esq.
Attorney for Appellant
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